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ABSTRACT
This paper uses pooled 1911, 1981, and 1986 Canadian census data
to evaluate the extent to which (1) the earnings of Canadian
immigrants at the time of immigration fall short of the earnings
of comparable Canadian-born individuals, and (2) immigrants'
earnings grow more rapidly over time than those of the Canadian-
born. Variations in the labor market assimilation of immigrants
according to their gender and country of origin are also
analyzed. The results suggest that recent immigrant cohorts have
had more difficulty being assimilated into the Canadian labor
market than earlier ones, an apparent consequence of recent
changes in Canadian immigration policy, labor market
discrimination against visible minorities, and the prolonged
recession of the early 1980s.
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THE CHANGING LABOR MARKET POSITION OF CANADIAN IMMIGRANTS
Immigration has accounted for slightly more than half of
Canada's population increase this century, with new immigrants'
share of population increase having grown steadily since the
1930s (Bloom and Gunderson 1991, p. 327). Especially since the
period following World War II, immigration has been a key
instrument of Canadian labor market policy. Policymakers have
used immigration flows to ameliorate the effects of variations in
labor market tightness, both across regions and over time.
Policymakers also expect immigration to be an important source of
future labor force growth, providing resources that will help
satisfy the growing health care and pension needs of an otherwise
aging population.
The importance of immigration to the growth and stability of
Canada's economy has given rise to a number of related policy
issues. First, "visible minorities" are one of four designated
groups targeted for affirmative action to promote employment
equity.1 Second, the effects of immigration are being
dramatically felt in the education system, especially in larger
cities, where increasing numbers of students do not speak English
or French as their primary language. Third, immigration has
always been a contentious issue with respect to its impact on the
1. Currently, the federal government has passed formal
employment equity legislation (including contract compliance),
which essentially requires affirmative action for four designated
groups: women, aboriginal people, handicapped people, and visible
minorities. Such legislation also exists, or is under
consideration, in a number of local jurisdictions.
2wages and employment of the native-born population. Finally,
multiculturalism has been fostered as a policy to encourage the
"vertical mosaic" image of Canadian society, as opposed to the
"melting pot" image that is the stereotype in the United States.
If the vertical mosaic is to prevail, however, immigrants must
have a reasonable opportunity to assimilate throughout the
vertical structure and not be segregated at lower rungs of the
ladder.
This paper focuses on a topic that cuts across all these
issues: the extent to which immigrants assimilate into the
Canadian labor market in the sense that their earnings patterns
come to match the earnings patterns of otherwise comparable
Canadian-born individuals.2 The paper's contribution is
empirical. It provides evidence on such factors as (a) the
extent to which immigrants' earnings at the time of immigration
fall short of the earnings of comparable Canadian-born
individuals (that is, the entry effect); (b) the extent to which
immigrants' earnings grow more rapidly over time than those of
comparable Canadian-born individuals (that is, the assimilation
effect); (c) the number of years it takes for immigrants'
earnings to catch up with those of comparable Canadian-born
persons; (d) the extent to which the observed patterns of such
assimilation may be biased because they do not adequately control
for unobserved quality differences across immigrant cohorts (that
2. Otherwise comparable is taken here to mean comparable in
terms of observed human capital and demographic characteristics.
3is, cohort effects) ;3 and (e) the degree of variation in the
labor market assimilation of immigrants according to such factors
as gender, country of origin, period of immigration, and the
state of the economy. This paper expands on Bloom and Gunderson
(1991) by adding evidence from the 1986 census, an important
update because it includes the effect of the prolonged recession
of the early 198 0s, and by adding evidence for women and region
of origin.
The paper begins with a brief description of Canadian
immigration policy during the period covered by our data
analyses. The basic empirical model is then set out, followed by
the empirical results and a comparison of the results with those
from other studies. The final section summarizes and discusses
the results.
CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
A number of key elements of Canadian immigration policy
during the period of our data analyses—the period following World
War II until the 1986 census—are likely to affect the
3. Quality is taken here to mean conventionally unobserved
attributes like motivation, ambition, and ability that may affect
earnings. Changes in conventionally observed determinants of
worker quality, such as years of education and work experience,
are controlled for by including them as regressors in the
earnings equations.
4selectivity, labor market behavior, and assimilation of
immigrants.4 These policy elements include the following:
1. An emphasis on skills and labor market criteria in
determining eligibility for immigration;
2. An emphasis on the labor market's capacity to absorb new
immigrants without placing undue hardship on the existing
domestic work force;
3. A willingness to change criteria in a "tap-on, tap-off"
fashion to alter immigrant flows to meet domestic economic needs;
4. The introduction of the point system in 1967, which was
skills oriented, but was mainly for the independent class, and
which otherwise led to greater emphasis on family reunification;
5. The increased emphasis in the late 1970s on human rights
and humanitarian issues as they related to immigrants, especially
refugees.
For our purposes, the changes in immigration policy that
occurred after the mid-1960s (points 4 and 5 above) are
particularly important. The point system introduced in 1967
continued the emphasis on skills orientation and adaptability to
the labor market; however, this emphasis applied mainly to the
independent class of immigrants (and to a lesser degree to
assisted relatives). Family reunification became more important
4. The key elements are discussed in an appendix that is
available from the authors on request. Green (1976) provides a
more detailed discussion of earlier immigration policy, with more
recent changes discussed in DeSilva (1992), Green and Green
(1993), Stoffman (1993), and Wright and Maxim (1991).
5as a criterion, and immigrants arriving to be with their families
did not have to meet the skills requirements.5
These changes were associated with two notable developments.
The first was a decline in the proportion of immigrants in the
independent and assisted relative (e.g., brothers, sisters,
cousins) categories (both of which have to meet the skills-
oriented criteria, with points awarded for having relatives in
Canada) and a dramatic increase in the proportion admitted under
the refugee and family classes (who did not have to meet the
skills criteria, but who entered to be reunited with their
families or as refugees) .6 These changes became especially-
pronounced after the early 1970s. Their dramatic effect is
illustrated by the changing distribution of immigrants by entry
category. In 1968 approximately 74 percent of immigrants were
admitted under the point-related independent and assisted
relatives categories, while 26 percent entered under family and
refugee status. By the 1980s these proportions had almost
reversed themselves, with only 3 5 percent admitted under the
5. Abbott and Beach (1993) document the fact that Canadian
immigration policy became increasingly skills oriented until the
late 1960s. Stoffman (1993)and Wright and Maxim (1991) document
how it became less skills oriented thereafter.
6. Under the Immigration Act of 1976, which was implemented in
1978, the category of nominated relative was replaced by assisted
relative, and the category of sponsored applicant was replaced by
the family category. The new categories were essentially the
same as the old ones, except that in the earlier designations,
parents and grandparents were included as nominated relatives if
under the age of sixty and as sponsored applicants if older than
sixty. In the 1976 designation they were categorized as family
irrespective of age.
6independent and assisted relatives categories and 65 percent
under family and refugee status (Wright and Maxim 1991).
The second development was a shift in the country of origin
distribution away from the industrial countries (notably European
countries and the United States) to the developing countries (see
Bloom and Gunderson 1991; Borjas 1988; Wright and Maxim 1991).
Wright and Maxim (1991) indicate that in 1968, approximately 80
percent of immigrants were from industrial countries and 2 0
percent were from developing countries. By 1985, 33 percent came
from industrial countries and 67 percent came from developing
countries. Presumably, the changes that occurred since the mid-
1960s have led to more difficulty in labor market assimilation
because of the decreased emphasis on skills orientation and the
greater emphasis on family reunification and human rights and
humanitarian issues. This hypothesis is tested empirically in
the following section.
THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK: ENTRY, ASSIMILATION, AND COHORT EFFECTS
The basic empirical model is a Chiswick (1978) type of
immigrant earnings equation, augmented to allow for the cohort-
specific effects emphasized by Borjas (1985):
y = X£ + of I + <5YSM(I) + EjGj
where
7y = natural logarithm of earnings
X = vector of standard human capital determinants of
earnings and other control variables (given in appendix I)7, with
associated parameter vector S;
I = dummy variable coded 1 for immigrants, 0 for Canadian-
born individuals;
YSM = years since migration for immigrants (= 0 for
Canadian-born individuals); and
COH = a vector of time period dummy variables reflecting
immigrants7 year of entry into Canada, coded in five-year
intervals (all dummies coded as 0 for the Canadian-born).
The coefficients of most interest in this specification are:
a = entry effect
5 = assimilation effect
0j = vector of immigrant cohort effects
Assuming that a<0 and 6>0, an estimate of the number of
years it takes for immigrants7 earnings to catch up with the
earnings of otherwise comparable Canadian-born individuals (that
7. Experience is measured here in the conventional fashion using
Mincer's identity (age minus education minus six), because the
census data do not contain a direct measure of actual experience.
The discrepancy between actual and measured experience could be
especially important for women, who are more likely to have
interruptions in their labor market experience. Because they use
the Canadian National Mobility Survey of 1973, which is unique
for Canada in that it has a measure of actual experience, Abbott
and Beach (1993), Beach and Worswick (1993), and Meng (1987) can
circumvent this problem. The trade-off, of course, is that the
1973 Mobility Survey data contain no information on immigrants'
assimilation patterns since the 1970s, which are the focus of
this analysis.
is, years to equality) is given by the number of years it takes
for the positive assimilation effect to offset the negative entry
effect (net of any cohort fixed effect) . This is calculated as
6
The entry effect, a, is simply the difference in earnings
between immigrants and otherwise comparable Canadian-born
individuals at the time of entry of the immigrants into Canada,
that is, when YSM = 0, and for the reference cohort that entered
prior to 1956. We would expect this difference to be negative,
reflecting the depreciated value of human capital that is
specific to the origin country, difficulties immigrants may
initially have in communicating in Canada, a possible lack of
information among Canadian employers concerning immigrants'
credentials and qualifications, and the possibility of relatively
more labor market discrimination against new immigrants.
The assimilation effect, 5, is the average percentage change
in immigrants' earnings for each year spent in Canada, over and
above any increases associated with other labor market
characteristics (such as experience) that both immigrants and
Canadian-born individuals enjoy. We would expect the estimate of
5 to be positive, reflecting the assimilation of immigrants into
the labor market as they generate credible information about
their skills (especially if immigrants are positively selected on
the basis of intelligence, ambition, spunk, and so on), as they
secure appropriate job matches, build their language skills,
9acquire other information valued in Canada, set up their own
businesses, and so on.8
The cohort effects, 6j, measure the average unobserved
quality of particular immigrant cohorts relative to the omitted
reference group of pre-1956 immigrants. For example, if the
quality of a given number of school years increased across
successive entry cohorts of immigrants, the corresponding
estimates of cohort effects would tend to be positive and
increase, irrespective of any cross-cohort changes in average
years of schooling.
The cohort effects are of interest because they will capture
the impact of immigration policy changes such as a shift from a
skills-oriented points system to a refugee or family-
reunification system, which may influence the labor market
adaptability of new cohorts in a manner that is not captured by
changes in immigrants' observed labor market characteristics.
8. Note that the assimilation effect in our analysis is linear,
i.e., 6 is constant. Chiswick (1978) and several other authors
have included a quadratic term for the effect of YSM. We included
such a term in some specifications of our model (not shown here).
This did not affect the entry and cohort effects significantly.
However, for the more recent cohorts, parameter estimates for the
specification imply that wage catchup will never occur. Since
even the linear specification implies an extremely long catchup
period, we chose to report those results.
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DATA ISSUES: CROSS-SECTIONAL, LONGITUDINAL, AND QUASI-
LONGITUDINAL DATA
The parameters of the empirical model in equation (1) cannot
all be estimated using a single cross-sectional data set. In
particular, the years since migration (YSM) variable is perfectly
collinear with the vector of cohort effects in a single cross-
section. For example, an immigrant in the 1986 census reporting
four years since migration would automatically have to be
included in the 1981-85 entry cohort. Early work in this area
using cross-sectional data estimated a version of equation (1)
that did not allow for cohort effects (see Chiswick 1978 and
Borjas 1982) . However, Borjas (1985) points out that biased
estimates of assimilation effects may result from this
specification. That is, the coefficient of YSM in a single
cross-section is the result of both the earnings growth
associated with YSM for a given cohort (the within-cohort effect)
and the earnings growth that may be associated with different
cohorts of immigrants (the cross-cohort effect).9
This problem can be circumvented by the use of longitudinal
data for which YSM does not uniquely determine an immigrants'
entry cohort. For instance, an immigrant with YSM = 10 in 1970
would have arrived in 1960, while an immigrant with YSM = 10 in
9. The coefficient may also reflect non-random patterns of
immigrant outmigration and immigrant mortality (see Lam, 1987 and
Bloom and Gunderson, 1991).
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1980 would have arrived in 1970. Unfortunately, to our knowledge
such longitudinal data are not available for Canada.
As an alternative, following Borjas (1985) for the United
States and Bloom and Gunderson (1991) for Canada, we use cross-
sections pooled over the 1971, 1981, and 1986 census years as a
"pseudo-longitudinal" data set. While the same individuals
cannot be identified across the three census years, different
individuals with the same number of years since immigration can
be identified as coming from different period of immigration
cohorts, that is, the YSM variable is not a linear combination of
the period of immigration cohort dummies. This data
configuration enables estimation of assimilation effects (within-
cohort earnings growth) as well as period of immigration cohort
effects (cross-cohort earnings growth).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical results are presented first for men (table 1)
and then for women (table 2) .10 Separate cross-sectional
regressions are reported for each census year. Pooled
regressions are also reported to control for possible cohort
10. The same regression specification is used for men and women
The usual caveats apply for women, especially in the measurement
of experience as noted earlier. Unfortunately, we could not
address this issue by including children ever born in the
equation because it was not reported the same way in all three
censuses. The 1971 and 1981 censuses report the number of
children ever born, while the 1986 census reports the number of
children by age group currently living in the family.
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effects. Appendix 1 defines the variables used in the analysis
and reports basic descriptive statistics for the variables.
Coefficient estimates for the human capital and other control
variables are shown in appendix 2 for men and appendix 3 for
women. (The regressions control for weeks worked per year and
hours worked per week so that the results can be interpreted in
terms of effects on hourly wages.) Separate results by region of
origin (Europe and the United States compared to Asia, Africa,
and Latin America) are given in table 3 for men and in table 4
for women. For expositional purposes, only the pooled results
controlling for cohort effects are presented in tables 3 and 4.n
Table 1 (for men) confirms the expected negative entry
effect and positive assimilation effect for each of the census
year cross-sections. For example, the 1971 census indicates that
immigrant men had, on average, a 5 percent earnings disadvantage
at the time of their arrival in Canada relative to comparable
Canadian-born men. However, their earnings grew by about one-
third of one percent faster per year, so that after fifteen years
their earnings had caught up with the earnings of Canadian-born
men. The fact that their earnings subsequently exceeded those of
otherwise comparable Canadians is consistent with the hypothesis
that immigrants are a positively selected group in terms of
unobservable characteristics such as motivation and ability.
11. Complete cross-sectional and pooled regressions by region of
origin are available from the authors on request.
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The negative entry and positive assimilation effects become
substantially larger (in absolute values) in the 1981 and 1986
censuses. For example, by 1986 the average immigrant had a 22
percent earnings disadvantage at the time of entry. Even though
the assimilation effect was also larger—almost 1 percent faster
earnings growth per year—it would take immigrants 26.5 years to
catch up with Canadian-born men.
The pooled regressions indicate that with the exception of
the 1961-65 cohort, each successive cohort of male immigrants had
lower earnings at the time of entry, even after controlling for
the effect of human capital and other determinants of earnings.
This cross-cohort trend is quite pronounced for immigrants
arriving in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, immigrants
arriving between 1981 and 1986 (years marked by Canada's longest
and deepest recession since the 1930s) earned 34 percent less
than did comparable Canadian-born men (-3 0.3 percent cohort
effect plus -3.5 percent entry effect) .12 As the next-to-last
column in table 1 indicates, immigrants who arrived in the 1970s
and 1980s, if they assimilate into the Canadian labor market at
the same rate as the earlier cohorts of immigrants (that is, have
12. Nakamura and Nakamura (1992) show that the labor market
position of immigrants is more sensitive to business-cycle
downturns than the position of comparable native-born
individuals, in both Canada and the United States.
14
the same rate of excess wage growth), will never attain the
earnings of otherwise comparable Canadian-born men.13
The persistence of this earnings decline throughout the
sustained prosperity of the 1970s, however, suggests that the
lower earnings were not just caused by the economy's inability to
absorb the new immigrants in times of high unemployment. One
likely explanation is declining immigrant quality in terms of
unobserved characteristics valued in the labor market, reflecting
the policy shift away from the skills orientation and towards
family reunification and human rights. Discrimination is another
possible explanation, given that the composition of immigrants
was changing rapidly towards visible minorities from Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. Another possibility is that more
recent cohorts of immigrants show an even greater tendency to
cluster together in networks of families and ethnic
neighborhoods, making them feel less pressured to learn a new
language and fit into the Canadian labor market.
13. Note that the calculations for the implied years to equality
may be somewhat uncertain for the recent cohorts given that they
are based on only a few years of experience in Canada. We do not
put any statistical significance levels to those calculations,
even though this is possible. The results should be interpreted
as projections only, not as precise estimates. The recent
cohorts might overtake Canadian-born individuals faster than
predicted because of a higher assimilation effect. Our
specification of a constant 5 does not allow that to happen. We
tried other specifications with interaction terms between the
assimilation and cohort effects. For some cohorts, the results
(available from the authors) showed a substantial reduction in
years to equality. However, the range of values of YSM for those
cohorts was also quite small, which makes any prediction of years
to equality unreliable. For that reason, our preferred
specification remained the one with a constant 5 estimated with
the information obtained from all the cohorts.
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Once the separate cohort effects are controlled for, the
entry and assimilation effects are reduced relative to those of
the separate census regressions. Overall, male immigrants into
Canada have all entered at an earnings disadvantage and have
enjoyed wage catchup at a rate of 0.25 percent per year, so that
it takes them, on average, about twenty-seven years to catch up.
The overall picture, however, is dominated by the cohort effects,
which show a clear pattern of increasingly lower earnings at the
time of entry for more recent cohorts such that they can never
expect to assimilate fully in the sense of catching up with
comparable Canadian-born men. This finding confirms the
importance of accounting for cohort effects in the analysis of
immigrant labor market assimilation.
The last column of table 1 presents the results of similar
calculations done for male immigrants into the United States
using the 1970, 1980, and 1990 U.S. censuses. (The full set of
results used to prepare these calculations are available on
request from the authors). These results also show a tendency
for years to equality to increase for the cohorts that arrived in
the mid-1960s and later. However, the estimates of years-to-
equality are smaller in magnitude for the United States than for
Canada, which suggests that recent immigrants to the U.S. are
assimilating faster than those entering Canada.
As table 2 shows, the picture for women is fairly similar to
that for men. The separate cross-sectional regressions for each
census year indicate a pattern of increasingly lower wages at
16
entry and more rapid assimilation, although the time needed to
catch up still exceeds twenty years in the 1981 and 1986
censuses.
The pooled regressions for women indicate a pattern of lower
entry wages for successive cohorts of immigrants, but not until
the 1970s, and especially the 1980s. Cohorts that entered after
the 1970s could not ever expect to assimilate fully in the sense
of catching up with comparable Canadian-born women. After
controlling for the cohort effects, the overall entry effect
indicates that immigrant women earn about 4 percent less than
comparable Canadian-born women. Their earnings growth is about
0.17 percent per year greater, but this is sufficiently small
that it will take them twenty-seven years (the same as for men)
to assimilate fully in the sense of catching up with the earnings
of comparable Canadian-born women. As with men, the average
twenty-seven years to equality masks large variations in the
assimilation prospects of different cohorts. The most
disconcerting finding is that recent cohorts of immigrant women,
as is the case with immigrant men, can never expect to become
fully assimilated.
While the assimilation coefficients for women are all
positive, they are uniformly smaller than those for corresponding
samples of men.14 This finding suggests that migration
14. The difference between the assimilation coefficients for men
and women is statistically significant at the 10 percent level or
less for each of the three cross-sectional regressions, but not
for the pooled regression.
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selectivity is stronger for men than for women, which is an
unsurprising result because women are more likely than men to be
tied movers (see Mincer 1978).
Finally, the last column of table 2 reports years to
equality for female immigrants into the United States (the full
results are available from the authors). The findings are
interesting, although somewhat puzzling. Contrary to our
expectation, all the female immigrant cohorts have a positive
earnings gap at entry, so that the estimated number of years to
equality is a negative number. This finding, which clearly
deserves further exploration, suggests that female immigrants in
the U.S. do not suffer any economic disadvantage, contrary to
their Canadian counterparts and to men in both countries.
RESULTS BY REGION OF ORIGIN
Table 3 reports results by region of origin for men. The
negative entry effects are much stronger for immigrants from
Asia, Africa, and Latin America than for immigrants from Europe
and the United States. Even though the assimilation effects are
also relatively large for immigrants from Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, they are insufficient to overcome the disproportionately
larger negative entry effects. Thus, catchup does not occur for
forty-three years, compared to eleven years for European and U.S.
immigrants. For both regions of origin, the cohort effects
generally show declining assimilation for the more recent
18
generations of immigrants. Each cohort of immigrants from Asia,
Africa, and Latin America took longer to assimilate than the
corresponding cohort from Europe and the United States. Indeed,
the post-1970 cohorts could not be expected to assimilate over a
reasonable work life.
Of considerable interest is the large negative cohort effect
for the most recent (post-1981) immigrants. Such a large
increase in the entry effect after 1981 could not reflect
increased discrimination, because it occurred for immigrants from
Europe and the United States as well as from Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, and it probably does not reflect the effects of
changes in immigration policy as few occurred during that period.
This leaves the labor market's inability to absorb new immigrants
during a prolonged recession as the most plausible explanation.
As indicated in table 4, the results for women by region of
origin are qualitatively similar to those for men, with one
exception: female immigrants from Asia, Africa, and Latin America
assimilate faster (in nineteen years) than their counterparts
from Europe and the United States (twenty-four years). Note,
however, that these estimates are somewhat imprecise because of
the relatively small sample sizes for the separate cohorts.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER STUDIES
The results described above are generally consistent with
those of previous studies based on independent data sets.
19
(DeSilva 1992 reviews the methodology, data, and results of many
of these and other related studies.) For example, based on the
1973 Job Mobility Survey, Abbott and Beach (1993) and Meng (1987)
found that men caught up at thirteen and fourteen years,
respectively, which is comparable to our estimate of fifteen
years from the 1971 census. Based on the same survey, Beach and
Worswick (1993) found the assimilation effect to be much smaller
for women than for men, but the wage disadvantage at the time of
entry was also smaller (in fact a premium) for women than for
men. For the closest comparable year of our data—the 1971
census—we also find smaller assimilation effects for women than
for men, although we find a statistically insignificant entry
effect for immigrant women. Comparisons among more recent
cohorts of immigrants are not possible because the Job Mobility
Survey is for 1973.
Similarly, our results are generally consistent with those
based on census data. Using 1971 data Tandon (1978) found that
immigrant men in Toronto catch up after sixteen years, which is
comparable to our estimate of fifteen years for immigrants across
Canada when our analysis is restricted to the 1971 census. Using
the 1981 census, Chiswick and Miller (1988) found that men caught
up after 22.0 years, which is similar to our estimate of 23.9
years when restricted to the 1981 census. Based on both the 1971
and 1981 censuses, Borjas (1988) documented the worsening
position of immigrants over time, especially as the composition
of immigrants changed towards groups that have more difficulty in
20
adjusting to life in Canada. Finally, Baker and Benjamin (1992),
Wright and Maxim (1991), and other studies that included the 1986
census also tended to find a worsening position of immigrants
over time.
CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis suggests that the Canadian labor market has not
been easily able to assimilate more recent cohorts of immigrants
given the changing nature of such immigration. Prior to 1965,
complete assimilation within fifteen years was the norm for both
men and women and for immigrants originating from different
regions. Thereafter, assimilation took longer and longer, with
complete assimilation appearing completely out of reach for post-
1970 immigrants. Assimilation has been particularly slow for
immigrant men from Asia, Africa, and Latin America compared to
those from Europe and the United States. For all regions of
origin, however, assimilation has been slower or nonexistent for
more recent cohorts.
Our results suggest that three major factors have
contributed to the decline in immigrant assimilation, namely:
1. Reduced immigrant quality because of changing
immigration policies;
2. Increased discrimination as the composition of
immigrants changed towards more visible minorities; and
21
3. Reduced absorptive capacity of the labor market,
especially for less skilled groups, possibly reflecting the
effect of prolonged recession.
The decline in assimilation began in the mid-1960s, just
after changes in immigration policy de-emphasized skills and
emphasized family reunification and human rights and humanitarian
issues. These changes led to a decline in the share of
immigrants in the skills-oriented independent category and to an
increase in the family category. They also led to a shift in the
composition of immigration from industrial to developing
countries. These changes may have led to a decline in immigrant
quality in terms of attributes that facilitate assimilation into
the labor market. They may also have led to increased
discrimination because immigrants from developing countries are
more likely to be visible minorities.
Increased discrimination cannot be the full explanation,
however, because the decline in assimilation occurred for
immigrants from Europe and the United States as well as for
visible minorities from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
(DeSilva 1992 provides evidence from the 1981 census that
indicates that there is little discrimination against immigrants
purely on the basis of color.) Neither can quality changes
(emanating from immigration policy) provide a full explanation,
because assimilation deteriorated markedly in the early 1980s,
and yet immigration policy did not change significantly at that
time.
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The large deterioration in assimilation that occurred for
the 1981-86 cohort suggests that the recession of the early 1980s
had a pronounced negative effect on the labor market position of
that cohort, but whether this is a lasting effect we do not know.
Recession, however, also cannot be the full explanation given the
continuous decline in assimilation prior to the 1980s.
Further research is clearly needed to quantify the relative
importance of the various factors contributing to the declining
assimilation of immigrants. At this stage, it appears that the
three factors considered here - immigration policy,
discrimination, and macroeconomic forces - have all contributed
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TABLE 1. Entry, Assimilation, and Cohort Effects, Canadian Immigrants, Men, 1971, 1981,
and 1986, with a comparison to the United States
Effect
(estimated














Entry Effect, -5.35 -13.84 -22.21
a X 100 (3.46) (8.16) (10.96)
Assimilation 0.35 0.58 0.84
















































The figures in parentheses are the absolute values of t-statistics.
Note: Coefficients estimated from y = Xb + al + 6 YSM(I)+ £j 9jC0Hj(I) , where y is the log of
earnings, X is human capital and other control variables, I denotes immigrants as
opposed to Canadian-born individuals, YSM is years since migration, and COHj is the
immigrant entry cohort.
(a) Calculated from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 U.S. censuses. The model specification is the
same as for Canada, with the following exceptions: a dummy for black is included; the
reference catagory is immigrants who arrived before 1960; one year must be subtracted
from all the cohort definitions (e.g., the 1961-65 Canadian cohort corresponds to the
1960-64 U.S. cohort). The U.S. data also allow us to calculate years to equality for
the more recent 1985-89 cohort of immigrants. The result is 61.4 years.
(b) Average years to equality, calculated as a weighted average for the different cohorts,
with cohort sample sizes used as weights.
n.a. = not applicable
TABLE 2. Entry, Assimilation, and Cohort Effects, Canadian Immigrants, Women, 1971, 1981,
and 1986, with a comparison to the United States
Effect
(estimated













Entry Effect, -0.33 -10.37 -10.63
a X 100 (0.15) (4.29) (4.13)
Assimilation effect, 0.10 0.35 0.44
















































See notes for table 1.






Europe Asia, Africa &
& U.S. Latin America
Implied years to equality
Europe Asia, Africa &
























- 1 . 0 0
(0 .56)
- 0 . 1 8
(0 .08)
- 0 . 2 8
(0 .12)
- 0 . 0 4
(0.02)
- 2 . 1 5
(0 .56)








- 1 . 2 7
(0.17)
- 7 . 6 0
(0.90)
























Europe Asia, Africa &
& U.S. Latin America
Implied years to equality
Europe Asia, Africa &






























- 2 . 5 2
(0 .57)
- 8 . 0 2
(1 .42)








0 . 9 1
(0 .09)
- 1 . 4 0
(0 .12)
- 7 . 2 2
(0 .54)
2 5 . 4
<0
3 . 3
2 3 . 2
5 5 . 7
121 .6
1 1 8 . 1
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The figures in parentheses are the absolute values of t-statistics




























































































































































































































The figures in parentheses are the absolute values of t-statistics
Note: See appendix 1.
APPENDIX 4
U.S. RESULTS
We replicated the analysis for the United States using data
from the public use samples of the 1970, 1980, and 1990 U.S.
censuses. Except for the sample proportions, which are 1-in-
1,000 for immigrants and l-in-5,000 for individuals born in the
United States, the sample restrictions and variable definitions
are the same (see appendix 1). The specification of the earnings
regression is also the same as in Canada, with one exception: a
binary indicator variable is included that takes the value one
for blacks. This variable could not be included in the analysis
for Canada because the census does not report race. Tables A4.1
and A4.2 present the U.S. results, for men and women, in the same
format as tables 1 and 2 of the main text did for Canada.
The results for men are, to a large extent, similar to those
for their Canadian counterparts. The cross-section regression
for 1970 provides an estimate of years to equality that is a bit
smaller than for Canada (nine years as opposed to fifteen), but
is nevertheless of the same order of magnitude. This indicates a
rapid rate of assimilation, and is consistent with other studies
of that period (in particular, Chiswick 1978). As with the
Canadian cross-section results, the number of years to equality
becomes larger later, reaching twenty-five years in 1980.
However, it decreases between 1980 and 1990, while it increases
slightly in Canada between 1981 and 1986.
The pattern of the pooled regression results is again very
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similar to the one in Canada, in that it reveals a clear trend
for the number of years to equality to become larger as we move
from the older to the more recent cohorts. However, the numbers
are somewhat smaller for the United States than for Canada. For
example, while Canadian immigrants who arrived between 1981 and
1986 would take more than one hundred years to assimilate, the
same immigrants in the U.S. would take forty years. For the most
recent U.S. cohort (1985-89), the number becomes larger (sixty-
one years), but it is still smaller than for the Canadian
immigrants who arrived after 1975. Although we recognize that
these calculations are somewhat imprecise, this analysis
nevertheless suggests that recent immigrant men in the United
States are assimilating faster than those entering Canada.
Unlike the Canadian results, the findings for women are very
different from those for men. Contrary to our expectations, the
entry effect is positive for two of the three cross-section
regressions. Similarly, in the pooled regression, the earnings
gap at entry (the entry plus the cohort effect) is positive for
all the cohorts except one (the 1985-89 cohort). In those cases,
immigrant women actually have an earnings advantage over U.S.-
born women that are comparable in observable dimensions, and the
estimated years to equality would be a negative number. These
results are somewhat puzzling and deserve further research.
Possibly the specification of the regression (which is the same
as that for men) does not account for all the particular features
of the female labor market (measurement of experience, and so
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on). However, as was the case for men, the results suggest that
female immigrants into the United States do not suffer as much of
an economic disadvantage as those coming into Canada.
Our analysis provides some preliminary evidence that recent
immigrants in Canada are having more difficulty adapting to the
labor market than those arriving in the United States. Note that
not all studies have reached this conclusion. For instance,
using data from the 1970s and earlier, Borjas (1990)* found
larger earnings gaps between natives and immigrants in the United
States than in Canada. He attributed this difference to Canadian
immigration policy being more successful than U.S. policy in
attracting skilled immigrants. Our results suggest that this may
no longer have been true in the 1980s.
borjas, George J. , Friends or Strangers: The Impact of
Immigrants on the U.S. Economy, New York, Basic Books, 1990.
Appendix 4
TABLE A4.1 Entry, Assimilation, and Cohort Effects, United States Immigrants,
Men, 1970, 1980, and 1980
Effect
(estimated








Entry effect, -4.24 -24.52 -16.19
a X 100 (1-19) (7.63) (5.85)
Assimilation 0.45 0.98 0.85


































Years to equality 9.3 24.9 18.9 27.1(a)
The figures in parentheses are the absolute values of t-statistics.
Note; Coefficients estimated from y = Xb + al + 5 YSM(I)+ Sj 0jCOHj(I), where y
is the log of earnings, X is human capital and other control variables,
I denotes immigrants as opposed to U.S.-born individuals, YSM is years
since migration, and COHj is the immigrant entry cohort.
(a) Average years to equality, calculated as a weighted average for the
different cohorts, with cohort sample sizes used as weights.
Appendix 4
TABLE A4.2. Entry, Assimilation, and Cohort Effects, United States Immigrants,
Women, 1970, 1980, and 1980
Effect
(estimated

























































Years to equality < 0 4.3 < 0 < 0(a)
See notes for table A4.1.
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